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Preface 
Society holds together and functions in large part through the moral systems of 
everyday life and of codified law. The historical evolution of social structure is 
intimately bound up with the evolution of moral systems. The study of moral 
judgment is thus important not only at the psychological level but also at the 
societal level. 
Concepts of recompense are prominent in law and everyday life, but experi-
mental analysis has been minimal. This seems surprising in view of the exten-
sive consideration given to concepts of responsibility and punishment. Recom-
pense is an important contributor to social cohesiveness, and its psychological 
analysis would contribute to more effective social evolution. 
Moral cognition is here considered part of general social cognition. This 
view is warranted by the discovery of a general cognitive algebra that applies 
equally across moral and nonmoral domains. 
The present experiments extend this view by showing that the basic blame 
schema, namely, intent-damage averaging, applies also to the the third variable 
of recompense. Paradoxically, the effect of recompense is substantially larger 
than the effect of the harm for which recompcnse is made. This paradoxical 
result is more pronounced at younger ages, moreover, which suggests that it 
may have a biological base in submission-acceptance reactions. 
The averaging rule for recompense is age-invariant down to 4 years of age. 
Values develop and change, but the intcgration schema is constant. Here, as in 
some other areas, cognitive algcbra provides an underlying invariance, a plat-
form for further analysis. Cognitive algebra can hclp unravel the structure of 
recompense as well as measure personal values with some genuine comparabil-
ity across age and culture. 
One line of further work lies in cooperative inquiry of psychology and law 
together. Experimental analysis is essential for cognitive theory of judgment-
decision in legal settings. The theory of information integration can help in this 
endeavo~ through the method of personal design, that is, by constructing experi-
ments taIlored to the value and expcriential systems of each individual. This 
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The moral rule not to do harm has a corollary moral rule to undo harm that is 
done. This moral rule of undoing harm is well recognized in everyday life. A 
child who dirties some object may be required to clean it. A person who insults 
another may be required to apologize. In married couples, recompense in the 
form of gifts or soft words is often part of "making up" for distressful acts. So 
ubiquitous is the moral rule of recompense that at least one philosopher (Ross, 
1930, p. 21) has elevated it to a prima facie duty. 
In law, too, recompense has a basic role. In civil law, the court may impose 
some form of reparation for breach of contract or for certain classes of property 
damage or personal injury. In criminal law, the judge may impose reparation as 
part of the sentence. A more general outlook on reparation appears in the social 
doctrine that criminals "must pay their debt to society." 
Despite its moral importance, recompense has received little attention from 
psychologists. The treatment of compensation for harmdoing by Walster, Wal-
ster, and Berscheid (1978) cites a variety of sociolegal observations but few 
experimental studies. Current theories of moral judgment generally ignore 
issues associated with positive aspects of undoing harm. 
One difficulty in studying recompense is that it usually involves other moral 
variables. Recompense ordinarily involves reference to the harm for which 
recompense is made, and evaluation of harm may require taking culpability into 
account. Various kinds of mitigating circumstances may also be relevant. 
Hence the study of recompense cannot get very far without capability for han-
dling multiple determination. 
This chapter takes up the study of recompense as part of a general theory of 
moral judgment that can handle problems of multiple determination. The basic 
theme is that moral judgment follows well defined cognitive rules. These rules 
govern the valuation of the operative moral variables in the context of the pre-
vailing stimulus field and their integration into moral responses. 
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Of special interest is that some moral rules appear to have simple algebraic 
forms. For example, several studies have supported an averaging rule, Punish-
ment = Intent + Damage, for the classical intent-damage question (Grueneich, 
1982; Hommers & Anderson, 1985; Leon, 1976, 1980, 1982, 1984; Surber, 
1977, 1982; see also Anderson, Volume III, Chapter 5). The moral algebra of 
recompense, however, has not been investigated. One question in the present 
studies is whether the Intent + Damage rule still holds when the variable of 
recompense is added. A second question concerns the nature of the rules 
governing the integration of recompense with intent and with damage. 
EXPERIMENT AL STUDIES 
Subjects were told stories about two stamp collectors, one of whom ruined some 
stamps belonging to the other. They were told to imagine that they were the vic-
tim and to say how much the offender should be punished. This ruined stamp 
scenario was chosen because it seemed to possess similar quality across an 
extended age range. General features of method were similar across the four 
experiments and will be summarized in this initial section on method. 
Design. The main design was a 3 x 2 x 3 factorial, with three levels of culpa, two levels 
of damage, and three levels of recompense. The three levels of culpa described acciden-
tal, careless, and intentional acts as follows (using personal pronouns from the male ver-
sion of the instructions). The accidental condition was "He was very careful and used 
the pair of tweezers. He concentrated very much on handing you a stamp with the 
tweezers. But, he did not see his glass of kool-aid and spilt it." The careless condition 
was "The open inkpot stood on his side of the table. You told him about the danger. 
But, he left the inkpot there. Later on, he pushed against it and spilt it." The intentional 
level was "He wanted your best stamp. But, you did not wish to exchange your best 
stamp. He became furious and poured ink on your stamp." The term, culpa, suggested 
by Hommers (1983a), seems preferable to the usual terms, intent and motive, to denote 
the operative variable of social responsibility. 
The two levels of damage stated the number of stamps that were ruined, 2 or 10, and 
2 or 16, in the various experiments. The three levels of recompense stated that none, half, 
or all of the ruined stamps were replaced by the offender. In addition to this complete 
three-factor design, certain two-factor and one-factor designs were also included in vari-
ous experiments. 
Punlshment Scale. Subjects made their punishment judgments on a 20-point graphic 
rating scale whose endpoints were defined by special end-anchor stimuli. The high end 
anchor included a display of 12 (or 20) ink-smeared stamps, the culpa information 
(accompanied by a line drawing) that "He was jealous of your fine stamp collection and 
wished to destroy it. Suddenly, he poured ink on your stamps," and the statement that no 
recompense was given. The low end anchor included a display of one ink-smeared 
stamp, the culpa information (accompanied by a line drawing) that' 'Before he arrived 
you were alone looking at your stamps. You pushed against your kool-aid and spilt it," 
3. MORAL ALGEBRA 103 
together with a display of an undamaged stamp given by the other person to repair the 
loss. Six practice trials from the main design as well as four presentations of each end 
anchor were given to acquaint the subject with the task. 
The foregoing procedure was designed to ensure that subjects used the rating scale as 
a true linear (equal interval) scale. This procedure has been generally successful in previ-
ous work based on functional measurement methodology (Anderson, 1981a, 1982). 
Procedure. Following practice, the regular experimental stimuli were read to the sub-
ject, using the gender pronoun corresponding to the subject's sex. On each trial, the three 
pieces of stimulus information were read in the natural order: culpa, damage, and recom-
pense. To help ensure attention to all of the information, the information was then 
repeated in abbreviated form in the opposite order. The experimental stimuli were 
presented in a different random order for each subject. Subjects were students at the 
University of California, San Diego, who served either for payor to fulfill a course 
requirement in introductory psychology. There were 20, 10, 18, and 10 subjects in the 
four respective experiments. 
EXPERIMENT 1 
PARADOXICAL EFFECT OF RECOMPENSE 
The purpose of this experiment was to obtain preliminary information on the 
integration rules for the three moral variables. In addition to the complete, 3 x 2 
x 3, Culpa x Damage x Recompense design, the corresponding two-factor 
Culpa x Damage and Culpa x Recompense designs were included. 
RESULTS 
It is convenient to organize the results around the integration rules for each pair 
of variables. Each rule will be presented in terms of its factorial graph, for this 
factorial pattern provides essential clues to the structure of the integration. Fol-
lowing this, a paradoxical effect of the recompense will be noted. 
Damage-Culpa Integration. The first question concerns the integration of 
damage and culpa; the relevant data are in the left panel of Figure 1. The two 
dashed curves represent the mean judgments of punishment from the two-factor, 
Damage x Culpa design. Each curve corresponds to one level of damage, which 
is listed by the curve, for the three levels of culpa listed on the horizontal axis. 
These two curves look essentially parallel, and this graphical appearance of 
parallelism is supported by the nonsignificance of the interaction, F(2, 38) = .04. 
Similarly, the two solid curves in the left panel of Figure 1 represent the 
corresponding Damage x Culpa graph, averaged over the recompense factor in 
the complete three-factor design. Here again the graphical appearance of paral-
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Figure 1. Assigned punishment as a function of culpa, damage, and recompense, 
Experiment 1. Each panel shows the factorial graph for one pair of moral variables, 
listed as curve parameter and on the horizontal axis. Solid curves from three-factor 
design; dashed curves from two-factor designs. (ACC. = accidental; CARE. = careless; 
INT. = intentional.) 
The observed parallelism is important theoretically because it implies that 
damage and culpa are integrated by an adding-type rule: 
Punishment = Damage + Culpa. 
This outcome will be verified repeatedly in the subsequent experiments. These 
experiments will also take up the issue of whether the adding-type rule is true 
addition or averaging. 
One further theoretical point is brought out by comparison between the 
dashed and solid curves in the left panel of Figure 1. The fact that they are 
parallel suggests that the integration of damage and culpa is the same, regardless 
of whether recompense is specified or not. This implication is important 
because giving recompense could have ramified effects, changing the effective 
values of the damage and culpa information and/or changing the rule that 
governs their integration. 
Recompense-Culpa Integration. The Recompense x Culpa factorial graph in 
the center panel of Figure 1 is markedly nonparallel, and this graphical appear-
ance is confirmed by the significant interaction term, F(4, 76) = 4.56. Integra-
tion of the recompense and culpa information cannot follow an additive rule, 
therefore, because an additive rule requires parallelism. However, the observed 
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pattern of nonparallelism can be accounted for by either a multiplying rule or an 
averaging rule. 
The multiplying interpretation is straightforward: Recompense decreases 
deserved punishment by a constant proportion. The half curve should therefore 
be lower than the none curve by a constant percentage at each level of culpa. 
The same holds for the curve for full recompense. Since the none curve hap-
pens to be approximately straight, the halfandfull curves should also be approx-
imately straight, but with proportionately lower elevations and lower slopes. In 
short, the three curves should exhibit a linear fan pattern-as they do. 
Under the averaging interpretation, the recompense information is processed 
in basically the same way as the damage and culpa information. To account for 
nonparallelism with the averaging rule requires an assumption of differential 
weighting (see Anderson, 1981a). Specifically, the averaging interpretation 
requires that the slope of each recompense curve be inversely related to its 
weight. This requires that half recompense has greater weight or importance 
than none, and that full recompense has greater weight than half, an assumption 
that is not unreasonable. Since the averaging and multiplying rules can both 
account for the observed patterns, additional data are needed to discriminate 
between them. This problem is taken up in Experiment 2. 
Damage-Recompense Integration. The right panel of Figure 1 shows the 
Damage x Recompense factorial graph. The two dashed curves from the two-
factor design are clearly nonparallel, and the interaction was significant, F(2, 
38) = 19.51. The same diverging pattern appears in the two solid curves from 
the full three-factor design, and it also showed significant deviations from paral-
lelism, F(2, 38) = 15.51. Like the recompense-CUlpa integration, therefore, the 
recompense-damage integration is nonadditive. 
The multiplying rule gives a ready explanation of these data. It implies that 
the factorial graph should have a linear fan shape, and just that shape appears 
for both designs. 
The averaging rule, however, also accounts for these data under the cited 
assumption that higher levels of recompense have greater weight. Since the 
averaging model requires the weights to sum to one, the relative weight of dam-
age must decrease at the higher levels of recompense. But the vertical separa-
tion between the two damage curves is a direct function of the relative weight of 
damage, and so they must be closer together at the higher levels of recompense. 
Thus, the same weighting assumption that enables the averaging model to 
account for the nonparallelism in the center panel also enables it to account for 
the nonparallelism in the right panel. 
There is one piece of evidence that favors the averaging rule over the multi-
plying rule. This comes from comparison of the dashed and solid curves in the 
right panel of Figure 1. The mean slope is less for the solid curves than the 
dashed curves, F(2, 38) = 53.92, and these two-factor patterns are significantly 
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different, as shown by the three-way interaction F(2, 38) = 5.88. Empirically, 
the difference between the dashed and solid curves results from the integration 
of the third factor, namely, the culpa information. If a multiplying operation 
were involved, then the solid curves, having flatter slope, would also have to 
have lower elevation. As the graph shows, however, the solid curves lie above 
the dashed curves at five of six data points. That is difficult to account for with 
a multiplying rule. Moreover, the solid curves cross over the upper dashed 
curve, which is also contrary to the multiplying rule. 
The averaging model provides a complete account of these data patterns. If 
the culpa information is averaged in, that decreases the relative weight of both 
recompense and damage information. Since the slopes of the curves are a direct 
function of the relative weight of recompense, the solid curves should have 
lower slope. And since the vertical separation of the curves is a direct function 
of damage, the solid curves should lie closer together, as they do. Moreover, the 
crossover of the solid and dashed curves is consistent with the averaging rule 
under the reasonable assumption that the mean culpa value is near the scale mid-
point. Thus, all three comparisons between the dashed and solid curves receive 
a unified interpretation under the averaging hypothesis. 
Paradoxical Effect of Recompense. Recompense has a much larger effect 
than damage, as may be seen in Figure 1 by comparing the left and center 
panels. The main effect of damage is given by the separation between the two 
damage curves labeled 2 and 10 in the left panel. Similarly, the main effect of 
recompense is given by the vertical separation among the curves in the center 
panel. As can be seen, the effect of recompense is several times larger than the 
effect of damage. This is paradoxical because the objective value of recom-
pense was not greater than that of damage. 
EXPERIMENT 2 
A VERAGING RULE FOR RECOMPENSE 
The results of Experiment 1 provided promising evidence for a moral algebra in 
judgments of punishment. However, the evidence that recompense information 
was integrated by an averaging rather than a mUltiplying rule was only sugges-
tive. Moreover, the recompense variable showed an unexpected, paradoxically 
large effect. The present experiment was designed to obtain firmer evidence on 
these two issues. 
All three two-factor designs were employed in essentially the same way as in 
the first experiment. In addition, judgments were obtained based on each single 
piece of information. These designs provide scale-free, crossover tests that 
discriminate between the averaging and multiplying models. General procedure 
was the same as in Experiment 1. 
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RESULTS 
Three main results were obtained. First, the paradoxical effect of recompense 
was verified. Second, the two-factor integrations showed the same patterns 
already found in Experiment 1. Third, the crossover tests supported the averag-
ing rule and ruled out the adding and multiplying rules. 
The data are in Figure 2. The solid curves in each panel represent the 
integration for one pair of information factors. The left panel portrays the Dam-
age x Culpa integration, with one curve for each number of damaged stamps 
and with the three levels of culpa on the horizontal. The two solid curves are 
approximately parallel, F(2, 18) = .04, replicating the result of Experiment 1. 
The two remaining panels of Figure 2 exhibit linear fan patterns like those seen 
in Experiment 1. In the present experiment, however, the linear fanning was 
statistically significant only for the Damage x Recompense graph in the right 
panel. Comparison of the left and center panels shows that recompense has 
much larger effect than damage, verifying the paradoxically large effect of 
recompense observed in Experiment I. 
Figure 2. Assigned punishment as a function of culpa, damage, and recompense, 
Experiment 2. Each panel shows the factorial graph for one two-factor design, with the 
two moral variables listed as curve parameter and on the horizontal axis. Dashed curves 
denote response to single moral variable listed on horizontal axis. (ACC. = accidental; 
CARE. = careless; INT. = intentional.) 
108 HOMMERS & ANDERSON 
Evidence for Averaging. The evidence for the averaging rule comes from 
comparison of the dashed and solid curves in each panel of Figure 2. Each 
dashed curve represents responses based on only one piece of information. In 
the left panel, for example, the label N.S. means that damage was not specified, 
and that the judgment was based on culpa alone. As can be seen, the lower solid 
curve crosses over the dashed curve. This crossover is contrary to an additive or 
summation rule, but supports the averaging rule. 
Although the logic of this crossover test is well known (see, e.g., Anderson, 
1981a), it may be useful to explain how it applies to the present task. In the left 
panel, both the additive and the averaging rules can account for the parallelism 
of the solid curves, but only the averaging rule can account for the crossover. 
To see this, note that the dashed curve represents judgments based on culpa 
information alone. Comparison of the dashed curve with the solid curve labeled 
2 shows what happens when the information that two stamps were damaged is 
added. If this information had an additive effect, then the solid curve would 
have to lie entirely on one side of the dashed curve. This prediction does not 
require that the additive effects be mathematically exact, only that the direction 
of effect be the same at each point. The crossover thus provides strong evidence 
against any form of additive model. 
Under the averaging hypothesis, the additional information about the two 
damaged stamps is averaged in with the culpa information. This is the milder 
level of damage, and may be assumed to have a value around the midpoint of 
the scale. Since this value is greater than the leftmost point on the dashed curve, 
averaging it in will raise the response to the lowest level of culpa; and since this 
value is lower than the rightmost point on the dashed curve, averaging it in will 
lower the response to the highest level of culpa. In this way, the averaging 
model accounts for the crossover in the left panel of Figure 2. 
In the other two panels of Figure 2, the theoretical issue is to test between 
the averaging and the multiplying rules. Here again the issue rests on com-
parison of the dashed and solid curves. The averaging rule provides a straight-
forward account of the crossover, in accord with the logic illustrated in the 
preceding paragraph. 
The mUltiplying rule, in contrast, cannot account for these data patterns. 
This rule requires that the dashed and solid curves form a linear fan with a com-
mon point of intersection. But in the center panel, the dashed curve intersects 
the two solid curves at different elevations, and the solid curves would only 
intersect if extrapolated to the left. Similarly, in the right panel, the dashed 
curve intersects the lower solid curve at about half recompense, whereas the two 
solid curves intersect at about full recompense. These data patterns are there-
fore sharply inconsistent with the mUltiplying rule. 
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Imputations. A final comment should be added concerning the question of 
imputations about unspecified information. Imputations are certainly possible. 
If only culpa is specified, for example, there is some presumption that damage 
occurred. If the subject made an imputation about damage and averaged that in, 
it would be the same as if damage had been specified. That would tend to elim-
inate the crossover in the left panel of Figure 2. Accordingly, the observed 
crossover indicates that if any such imputations were made, they had rather little 
influence in these judgments. 
The question of imputations becomes central when only recompense is 
given, in the right panel of Figure 2. Objectively, recompense cannot occur in 
the absence of damage. On a rational basis, therefore, the subjects could not 
make a judgment without an implicit inference about damage. Rationally, there-
fore, the dotted curve should not cross over, but should form part of the fan-like 
pattern with the dashed curves. 
The subjects are not compelled to be rational in this way, of course, and the 
pattern of data indicates that they are not. Instead, it appears that they attach a 
value to recompense per se, and make a judgment on that basis, without attempt-
ing to integrate an inferred level of damage. This strategy is not entirely unrea-
sonable, for recompense may have a moral value per se, as an indication of a 
favorable trait of the person. Not too much should be made of one incidental 
result, but it does illustrate how simple integration experiments can reveal 
aspects of moral algebra that might otherwise be difficult to uncover. Imputa-
tions have been found to be important in other situations and present some 
interesting problems in cognitive analysis (Anderson, Chapter 2 of Volume I). 
EXPERIMENT 3 
ORDER INV ARIANCE OF INTEGRATION RULES 
This experiment addresses the question of whether the integration process is 
affected by the order in which the information is presented. This question has 
special importance because culpa, damage, and recompense seem to be qualita-
tively different kinds of information. It is somewhat surprising, therefore, that 
the two previous experiments found evidence for an averaging process because 
averaging seems to require qualitatively similar information. 
It is entirely possible, of course, that all three kinds of information are 
evaluated in common moral currency and then averaged. It is also possible, 
however, that the averaging rule obtained in the previous experiments results 
from some particular processing order adopted by the subjects. In particular, the 
subjects may have adopted the strategy of beginning with an equal-weight 
averaging of culpa and damage, and then modifying this judgment by making a 
unequal-weight subtractive averaging of recompense. 
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To study this question, the information was presented in three different 
sequences, each hypothesized to correspond to a reasonable processing strategy. 
The sequence, first culpa and damage. then recompense, could be expected to 
elicit an act-wise information processing, congruent to the natural causal order 
implicit in this sequence. 
The sequence,first culpa and recompense. then damage, could elicit an ini-
tial integration of the two "subjective" components, followed by a further 
integration of the "objective" damage component. In this sequence, recom-
pense might still be averaged, but with equal rather than differential weighting. 
Finally, the sequence, first damage and recompense. then culpa, could elicit 
an initial integration in which recompense acts as a multiplier on the damage. 
This initial multiplication would be followed by an averaging integration of 
culpa. Regardless of the plausibility of these particular hypothesized rules, it is 
clearly advisable to test whether order of presentation affects the generality of 
the results of Experiments 1 and 2. 
Each subject received all three pieces of information in one of the three or-
ders already indicated. In order to crystallize and assess any possible order 
effects, the subject made an intermediate judgment after the first two pieces of 
information were presented. The third piece of information was then presented 
and, to minimize memory loss and inattention, all three pieces of information 
were repeated in the same order in abbreviated form. Following this repetition, 
the final judgment was made. 
The basic stimulus design was the three-factor, Culpa x Damage x Recom-
pense design of Experiment 1. The higher level of damage was changed from 
10 to 16 stamps in an (unsuccessful) attempt to increase the main effect of dam-
age. Each subject served in all three sequence conditions, randomly assigned in 
equal numbers to the six possible permutations of the three sequence conditions. 
Each sequence condition was preceded by instructions, end anchors, and prac-
tice trials, which presented the information in the same order as the sequence 
condition. General procedure was the same as in Experiments 1 and 2. 
RESULTS 
Generality of Integration Rules. The essential results of this experiment can 
be summarized very simply. The factorial graphs for the intermediate judg-
ments, based on only two pieces of information, had essentially the same form 
as in the previous experiments. The same was true for the final judgments, 
based on all three pieces of information. Moreover, the final judgments were 
essentially unaffected by the order in which the information was presented. The 
integration rules are the same, therefore, regardless of the amount of information 
and regardless of its order of presentation. 
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Figure 3 presents a detailed view. The two Damage x Culpa graphs in the 
left panel are essentially parallel. The intermediate judgments based on only 
two pieces of information are shown by the dashed curves; the final judgments 
based on all three pieces of information, but averaged over the recompense fac-
tor, are shown by the solid curves. This graphical parallelism was supported by 
the nonsignificance of the Damage x Culpa interactions, F(2, 34) = .28 and .98 
for the intermediate and final judgments, respectively. 
A similar story holds for the Recompense x Culpa and the Damage x 
Recompense graphs in the center and right panels. These graphs show the pat-
tern already seen in Figures 1 and 2. The divergence from parallelism yielded 
significant interactions in three of the four cases: F(4, 68) = .67 and 2.86 for the 
intermediate and final judgments for Recompense x Culpa; and F(2, 34) = 11.29 
and 16.64 for the intermediate and final judgments for Damage x Recompense. 
Moreover, the intermediate and final judgments exhibit the same pattern in each 
panel of the graph. 
The question of uniformity of the integration rules was assessed statistically 
by employing sequences as a fourth factor in an analysis of variance on the final 
judgments. If the order of presentation affects the integration rule, that will 
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Figure 3. Assigned punishment as a function of culpa, damage, and recompense, 
Experiment 3. Each panel shows the factorial graph for one pair of moral variables, 
listed as curve parameter and on the horizontal axis. (ACC. = accidental; CARE. = care-
less; INT. = intentional.) 
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information factors. None of these interactions was significant. There was a 
main effect of sequences, F(2, 34) = 4.73, with the highest judgments of punish-
ment in the culpa-dam age-recompense sequence, and the lowest judgments in 
the culpa-recompense-damage sequence. The reasons for this effect are not 
clear, but it only pertains to the overall level of judgment, not to the pattern. 
Thus, it requires no qualification on the uniformity of the integration rules. 
Further evidence that order of presentation does not affect the integration rule 
has been obtained by Grueneich (1982) and Surber (1982). 
Paradoxical Recompense Effect. The data of Figure 3 corroborate the two 
previous experiments in finding an extremely large effect of recompense. Com-
parison of the vertical spread of the left and center panels shows that recom-
pense has approximately four times the effect of damage. This comparison 
seems paradoxical because the objective value of recompense was not larger 
than the value of damage. 
Furthermore, recompense has approximately twice the effect of culpa, as 
may be seen from inspection of the Recompense x Culpa graph in the center 
panel. This suggests that the large recompense effect cannot be explained 
merely by considering recompense in subjective rather than objective terms, 
because the culpa variable is entirely subjective and covers a large range, from 
accident to intentional malice. 
Theoretical implications of this recompense effect will be taken up in the 
discussion. Here it is noted that the averaging model provides two implications 
about what is going on. Both relate to the two-parameter representation of the 
averaging model, according to which the effect of each variable depends on 
both its weight and on its range of scale values. 
The first implication concerns the small effect of damage. This does not 
mean that subjects consider that damaging 2 stamps is almost as bad as damag-
ing 16 stamps. The badness values of these two deeds are quite different; but 
for assigning punishment, subjects attach low weight to the damage variable. 
This implication follows from comparison of the solid and dashed curves in 
Figures 1 and 3. In each panel, the solid curves differ from the dashed curves 
by the addition of a third piece of information, which the preceding results have 
shown to be integrated by the averaging rule. The averaging rule requires the 
solid curves to have flatter slope than the dashed curves in direct proportion to 
the weight of the additional information, regardless of its scale value. Similarly, 
the averaging rule requires the solid curves to lie closer together than the dashed 
curves in direct proportion to the weight of the additional information, regard-
less of its scale value. 
To apply this theoretical rationale, note that the solid curves are flatter and 
closer together in the left panels of Figure 1 and 3. That implies that the added 
recompense information has substantial weight. In the right panels, similar rea-
soning shows that the added culpa information has substantial weight. But in 
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the center panel of Figure 3, the solid and dashed curves have approximately 
equal slope and equal vertical spread. It follows that the additional damage 
information has relatively small weight. 
But as already noted, the actual observed effect of any piece of information 
depends both on its scale value and on its weight. The small effect of damage is 
thus a result of its small weight. It would be incorrect to conclude that badness 
value is not much different for low and high damage. On the contrary, since the 
weight is small, the badness values must be quite different to account for the 
observed effect. 
Similar reasoning applies to the comparison of recompense and culpa. The 
mean vertical separation of the two dashed curves is less in the left panels than 
in the right panels of Figures 1 and 3. Since the damage factor is the same in 
both, it follows that culpa has somewhat greater weight than recompense. It fol-
lows, therefore, that recompense must have substantially greater range of scale 
value than culpa in order to account for its larger observed effect. 
EXPERIMENT 4 
TWO COMPONENTS OF RECOMPENSE 
The operation of recompense in judgments of deserved punishment seems 
straightforward: The punishment should fit the crime. Since recompense 
reduces the harm, it should reduce the punishment. This effect has its locus in 
the victim. 
But, recompense has a second component, which has its locus in the 
offender. Voluntary recompense confers a positive moral benefit on the 
offender, thereby decreasing culpa and hence also punishment. Involuntary 
recompense serves as punishment, which subtracts from the total deserved pun-
ishment to yield the assigned punishment. 
This experiment presents an initial study of the two components of recom-
pense just considered. The main hypothesis was that recompense and culpa 
should exhibit an interactive effect that relates to the nonadditivity previously 
observed in the integration rule. The design was the same as the three-factor 
design of Experiment 1, except that the level of half recompense was replaced 
by the information that "The insurance paid back for all of the ruined stamps." 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The essential results are shown in the Recompense x Culpa graph of Figure 4. 
The top and bottom curves represent the same conditions studied in the preced-
ing experiments and they show the same nonadditivity, which is reflected in the 
nonparallelism. 
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Figure 4. Assigned punishment as 
a function of culpa and recompense, 
Experiment 4. (ACC. = accidental; 

























The difference between the top and middle curves is considered to represent 
the effect of the first component of recompense, namely, that associated with the 
harm to the victim. Similarly, the difference between the middle and bottom 
curves is considered to represent the second component of recompense, namely, 
that associated with the offender. 
Main interest is on the comparison of the two lower curves, which represent 
complete recompense, either by the insurance or by the offender. These two 
curves show the hypothesized interaction. When the damage was accidental, at 
the left of the graph, it makes little difference whether the recompense was 
given by the offender or by the insurance. 
With careless or intentional damage, however, more punishment is assigned 
when the compensation is made by insurance. This effect was significant, as 
shown by the interaction term for these two curves, F(2, 18) = 7.33. 
This interaction is as expected from the hypothesis of two components of 
recompense. For accidental damage, there is one main component, namely, that 
associated with the harm to the victim. Given full recompense, its source is 
mainly immaterial for the assignment of punishment. 
In contrast, careless and intentional damage carry two components, one 
associated with the damage itself, the other associated with the harmful action. 
Indeed, the present data suggest that the latter component may be the more 
important since the middle curve is closer to the top curve than to the bottom 
curve. This two-component interpretation will produce nonparallelism by virtue 
of differential weighting, since the second component adds more weight. The 
present data, of course, do not rule out an effect of the second component on the 
net value of the recompense. 
An incidental result is that judged punishment is reduced by insurance com-
pensation even when the damage is accidental. In this case, the offender is held 
responsible to some degree even when the net damage is zero. This may seem 
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contrary to justice, but it should be kept in mind that the tenn accidental is only 
a label for an experimental manipulation, and does not necessarily remove the 
implication that care and foresight could have avoided the damage. Results by 
Leon (1980) point to social learning, since it was mainly the youngest children 
in his study who discounted damage when it was accidental. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Three topics are considered in this discussion. The first is a brief review of the 
present and related results on moral algebra. The second concerns the structure 
of recompense. The third and final topic considers moral algebra in the law. 
MORAL ALGEBRA 
The results of all the experiments support the hypothesis that judgments of 
deserved punishment obey a moral algebra. These results agree with previous 
work on intent-damage integration and extend it to include the factor of recom-
pense. Two integration rules, as well as certain questions of generality, require 
consideration. 
Averaging of Culpa and Damage. The two moral variables, culpa and dam-
age, obeyed an equal-weight averaging rule. The parallelism pattern of the 
Culpa x Damage graphs in Experiments 1-3 points to one of two integration 
rules: adding or averaging. The adding-averaging question was resolved by 
inclusion of scale-free tests, especially in Experiment 2. These scale-free tests 
ruled out the adding rule and supported the averaging rule. 
These results support and extend work by Leon (1976, 1980) and Surber 
(1977, 1982), who also found evidence for averaging of culpa and damage. The 
present results show the same averaging rule when the third variable of recom-
pense is also specified. This integration, moreover, was the same regardless of 
the order in which the three moral variables were presented. 
These extensions of previous work are important because they point to the 
generality of moral integration rules. Results obtained with simple infonnation 
fields may thus hold for more complex fields. Further work, especially in more 
natural situations, is needed to assess the scope and limits of rule generality. 
Two exceptions to the averaging rule in previous work require comment. A 
number of Leon's (1980) subjects followed the averaging rule except when the 
action was accidental, in which case damage was excluded from the integration. 
This accident-configural rule was fairly frequent among the youngest children, 
although infrequent among adults. According to Leon's interpretation, older 
subjects may assign definite culpa value even for accidents. Older subjects 
could, in particular, hold the actor responsible for accidents that resulted from 
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lack of prudence or foresight, whereas younger children might well be less 
demanding in this regard. A remarkable later result (Leon, 1984) found 
mother-son similarity for this accident-configural rule. 
Surber (1977) found nonparallelism in her second experiment, which might 
seem to disagree with the averaging rule. However, inspection of her data (Fig-
ure 3, p. 661) shows parallelism separately for damage and for favorable out-
comes. The nonparallelism resides in the comparison between harmful and 
favorable outcomes. This pattern of nonparallelism agrees with the averaging 
rule under the assumption that damage has greater importance than favorable 
outcome. This interpretation is consistent with the substantial literature on 
negativity effects in social judgment, beginning with Anderson (1965) and Lam-
pel and Anderson (1968). It is also consistent with the parallelism obtained by 
Lane and Anderson (1976) for judgments of gratitude based on intent and favor-
able outcomes. 
Nonadditive Averaging of Recompense. The factorial graphs for recompense 
showed nonparallelism, both for recompense-damage integration and for 
recompense-culpa integration. The observed pattern of interaction could be 
accounted for either by the multiplying rule or by the averaging rule with dif-
ferential weighting. The scale-free tests of Experiment 2 infirmed the multiply-
ing rule and supported the averaging rule. 
The pattern of nonparallelism for integration of recompense implied that the 
importance or weight parameter was higher for greater levels of recompense. 
Thus, full recompense not only had higher scale value than half recompense, but 
also greater importance. 
Overall, the results point to the operation of a general averaging rule for 
judgments of punishment. This rule has equal weighting within the damage and 
culpa dimensions, and differential weighting within the recompense dimension. 
This, together with other results, suggests that recompense effects may be medi-
ated through other moral categories, as indicated in the later discussion of struc-
ture of recompense. 
Recompense in Judgments by Children. Data consistent with the integration 
rules found here with adults have been observed with children (Hommers & 
Anderson, 1985). For children, as for adults, culpa and damage may be 
integrated by equal-weight averaging, whereas recompense appears to be 
integrated with both culpa and damage by nonadditive averaging, that is, 
averaging with differential weighting. Cross-cultural generality was shown by 
Hommers (1985, 1986c), who found similar results for children and adults in 
Germany. Integration rules thus appear age-invariant down to 4 years. 
Developmental trends were found, however, in moral values. Most notable 
was an accentuation at younger ages of the paradoxical outcome that recom-
pense had far greater effects than the damage for which recompense was made. 
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Damage, on the other hand, had smaller effects at younger ages. Methodologi-
cal checks indicated that these developmental changes were real. 
This pattern of value development disagrees with the traditional objective-
subjective characterization that younger children show greater sensitivity to 
objective factors, such as damage. Nevertheless, this pattern is consistent with 
the fairness studies of Anderson and Butzin (1978), who found that the subjec-
tive factor of need had at least as much effect as the objective factor of deed. 
The paradoxical effect may, of course, be peculiar to the present stamp scenario, 
in which recompense includes both objective and subjective components. 
Further tests with purely subjective recompense are thus desirable. The problem 
of comparing importance of objective and subjective factors, already mentioned, 
may be solvable with recent developments in estimation theory for the averag-
ing model (Zalinski & Anderson, Volume I, Chapter 10). 
The paradoxical effect of recompense was accentuated in preschoolers stu-
died by Hommers (1986b), who rated half-recompense with a large number of 
damaged stamps better than half-recompense for a small number of damaged 
stamps. With older children and adults, similar inversion was observed only for 
full-recompense and double-recompense (see similarly Hommers, 1988d). Such 
disordinal patterns of data can be accounted for by the averaging model with 
differential weighting. This moral algebra thus provides a base for measure-
ment of developmental trends in weighting that could not be detennined with 
other methods. 
Social Reality. Moral algebra is considered to provide a general foundation for 
everyday moral judgment and behavior. One basis for this statement lies in the 
generality of the integration rules just discussed. A second basis lies in the simi-
larity of results in the moral and extra-moral domains, for the present moral 
algebra mirrors the cognitive algebra previously found in diverse areas of social 
judgment, including person cognition, causal attribution, fairness, social atti-
tudes, and marriage (see Anderson, 1981a,b). Moral judgment, accordingly, is 
considered to have the same cognitive structure and obey the same cognitive 
processes found in these other areas of social cognition. Moral judgment thus 
becomes part of a unified, general theory. 
Unified theory may seem unlikely in view of the obvious complexity of 
everyday morality. Unified theory is possible, however, through a focus on 
deeper levels of processing. Everyday morality is complex because moral 
values are extremely sensitive to the particular social situation. The further 
dependence of values on the individual and individual-role interactions with the 
social situation increase the complexity. Nowhere are individual differences 
greater than in moral values, and nowhere are situational effects greater. Theory 
construction requires an approach that can allow for such value complexity in 
tenns of process simplicity. 
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Integration theory allows and indeed insists that values are sensitive to indi-
vidual and situation. The rules for integrating these values, in contrast, are con-
sidered to have substantial invariance. This rule invariance provides a theoreti-
cal foundation for value analysis by means of functional measurement method-
ology. Functional values that are operative in given individuals and in particular 
situations can thus be assessed. The complexity of everyday morality, far from 
being an objection to moral algebra, testifies to its unique power. 
Phenomenology and Experiment. Moral algebra is not just an end in itself. It 
also provides a basis for unifying the phenomenological and experimental 
approaches. Potential for unification appears in the dual qualitative-quantitative 
nature of an algebraic integration rule. The qualitative aspect appears in the 
concepts specified in the rule. The concept of culpa, for example, is taken from 
common language and phenomenology, but that does not guarantee that it 
represents a cognitive entity. Finding that culpa obeys an exact algebra confers 
some measure of construct validity. The quantitative precision of moral algebra 
thus has qualitative value for assessing cognitive reality. 
The precision of cognitive algebra can also provide validity criteria for 
phenomenological analysis. Consciousness can provide priceless cues about 
cognitive process, but validity assessment is essential, as shown by the many 
failures of the phenomenological method. Reliance on subjects' verbal reports 
has repeatedly led to misconceptions, as with Piaget's ill-fated centration 
hypothesis, which originated in his studies of moral judgment (see also Ander-
son, Volume III, Chapter 5). Cognitive algebra can provide such validity cri-
teria. More important, cognitive algebra can provide a foundation for experi-
mental validation of phenomenological methodology. 
STRUCTURE OF RECOMPENSE 
Recompense is psychologically complex. Further work requires a more general 
conceptual framework than was needed in the foregoing experiments. The 
blame schema (Anderson, 1976; this volume, Chapter 6) provides a useful 
framework for thinking about recompense, as illustrated in the following struc-
tural analysis. Among the implications of this analysis of the blame schema are 
first, that recompense needs to be studied as one member of the class of blame-
reducing informers, and, second, that retributional punishment needs to be 
treated as one form of recompense. Although this usage may seem odd, it 
agrees with the dictionary definitions for both English and German (recompense 
= Wiedergutmachung), and it seems necessary for a unified treatment 
Blame Schema and Blame-Reducing Variables. The blame schema, which is 
taken from everyday life, specifies deserved blame as a joint function of the 
damage, or outcome, of some action and the culpa, or social responsibility, for 
the action. Symbolically, 
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Blame = Culpa \$ Damage. 
Here \$ is an integration schema, which, as the present results indicate, assumes 
the form of an averaging rule under fairly general conditions. For present pur-
poses, however, the exact form of \$ is not of concern. What is of present con-
cern is that recompense can act through each of the three terms of this schema. 
Each term represents one mode of reducing blame. 
The primary locus of reparational recompense is the damage term, as illus-
trated in the present stamp experiments. However, recompense may also 
operate through the other two terms of the blame schema. Voluntary recom-
pense, for example, confers positive moral value, and so reduces culpa, or 
responsibility. Voluntary recompense also implies some acceptance of blame, 
and so, by the principle of due measure, reduces the amount of additional 
deserved blame. In this way, as indicated previously, recompense appears to 
operate through other moral categories. 
It is desirable, therefore, to amplify the discussion of the blame schema to 
consider recompense within the larger class of blame-reducing stimuli. This 
may help avoid neglect of moral variables that are related to recompense or that 
contain some component of recompense. Each of the three terms of the schema 
may be reconsidered in this way. 
With regard to the damage term, three kinds of harm must be considered: 
material damage, personal injury, and mental suffering (e.g., ego-injury, grief, 
resentment). Recompense in the form ofreparation can, accordingly, take many 
forms. Exact reparation, as in the present stamp scenario, is convenient experi-
mentally but unusual socially. Material compensation typically involves some 
different good, especially money or gifts. Nonmaterial recompense, such as 
apology, which has a primary function of ameliorating insult or injury, may also 
serve in lieu of material recompense. In addition, blame may be given for 
wrong acts for which there is no victim or even any specifiable damage (Ander-
son, this volume, Chapter 6). In this case, recompense may take the form of 
symbolic undoing of the wrong act, as by promising not to do it again. 
A second locus for blame reduction is the blame term itself. Loss and 
suffering by the offender, for example, are often viewed as retribution, which, 
by the principle of due measure, reduces blame and deserved punishment. Loss 
and suffering may thus be considered a form of recompense. Apology may 
similarly be a form of recompense. Forced apology may constitute disagreeable 
retribution, whereas free apology may constitute some acceptance of blame that 
reduces further deserved blame and punishment. 
Variables that affect the blame term may also affect culpa. Free apology, for 
example, may reduce culpa by reducing an implied malicious intent. Repen-
tance and remorse seem to include a component of apology that acts in much the 
same manner. 
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The blame schema has a general role in everyday morality. Virtually all 
social relations are pervaded by blame, whereas punishment depends on rela-
tions of authority or power. Blame is common in marriage, for example, and in 
diverse other social groups in which one would not ordinarily speak of punish-
ment. Moreover, blame appears to underlie the recompense function of punish-
ment. The blame schema thus appears to offer a useful organizing principle for 
moral judgment with considerable analytical power. 
Harmdoer-Victim Duality. A basic duality in the concept of recompense 
appears in the dual roles of harmdoer and victim. Recompense has separate 
components that correspond to harm doer and victim, or more generally, to the 
actor and the action. 
One component is undoing the harm-this is the explicit function of recom-
pense. Reducing harm, as the blame schema shows, acts directly to reduce 
deserved punishment. 
The actor component is really two components, the first of which involves 
retribution. A person who makes reparation presumably suffers by doing so, 
whether from material loss or from self-humbling. This suffering constitutes a 
form of punishment, which subtracts from the punishment deserved for the ori-
ginal action. 
In addition, recompense may confer positive moral value. At least when it is 
voluntary, recompense implies repentance and partial disavowal of the harmful 
act. This positive moral information about the actor is integrated into the culpa 
term, thereby reducing the judgment of deserved punishment. 
The conception of separate harmdoer and victim components of recompense 
has been empirically fruitful in several studies (Hommers, 1988a,b, 1989) in 
which the harm doer component was operationalized as apology and the victim 
component was specified by third-party compensation to separate it from the 
harm doer component. Apology had strong effects but showed no age trend 
from kindergarten to adult. This result included mentally retarded adults, whose 
judgments were like those of normal adults in all respects. Third-party compen-
sation was nearly as effective as apology but its effects decreased with age. 
These results indicate that the present age decrease in effect of recompense may 
be attributed to the compensation component. 
Expiation and Reciprocity. Recompense and punishment should fit the 
offense, not merely in quantitative proportion, but also in quality. This was a 
prominent theme in Rousseau's views on education, as in his Emile (1978). 
This theme also appears in Piaget's (1932/1965) investigations of children's 
understanding of punishment, which concluded that there was a trend from expi-
ation to reciprocity, that is, in his terms, from punishment of arbitrary quality to 
punishment of a quality in some manner fitting to the offense. Piaget's conclu-
sion, however, does not follow from his data, due to defects in his method. 
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These defects may be illustrated with Piaget's story of the boy who played 
ball in his room, against his father's orders, and broke a window pane. The sub-
ject was asked which punishment was fairer: (1) to leave the window unmended 
for several days so that (it being winter) the boy cannot play in his room; (2) to 
make the boy pay for the window; (3) to deprive the boy of toys for a whole 
week. But these three punishments obviously differ not simply in expiation-
versus-reciprocity, but also in severity and in meaningfulness. This confound-
ing invalidates Piaget's argument. 
It may be added that Piaget's stories seem to further confound both severity 
and meaningfulness with age. Paying for the broken pane could seem severe 
punishment to a 12-year-old, to whom money could be important, but much less 
meaningful to many 6-year-olds. Deprivation of toys might well show the oppo-
site confounding. Such confounding invalidates the developmental comparisons 
made by Piaget. 
Indeed, Piaget's investigations led to serious misunderstanding of moral 
development (see Anderson, Volume III, Chapter 5). Furthermore, children 
even younger than those studied by Piaget exhibit great sensitivity to recom-
pense (Hommers, 1986b,c; Hommers & Anderson, 1985). This suggests that 
they would consider recompense desirable in Piaget's task of choosing fitting 
punishment, although a more direct test would be required to verify this. 
To be sure, there may be a developmental trend towards preference for pun-
ishment that fits the offense in quality as well as in degree. Such a trend must be 
expected simply because judgment of fittingness requires an additional, more 
complex cognitive operation, and so would necessarily develop later. Present 
results suggest that fittingness will influence judged punishment as soon as 
fittingness can be understood. 
Stimulus and Response Modes. Recompense may be studied in two quite dif-
ferent modes: as stimulus or as response. In the stimulus mode, which was used 
in the present experiments, recompense is specified as part of the given stimulus 
information. The stimulus mode is potentially complex, for it may involve all 
three components of the blame schema. It has the advantage, however, that 
each component is subject to separate manipulation. In Experiment 4, for exam-
ple, the insurance manipulation separated the harmdoer and victim components. 
Such stimulus manipulation provides leverage for determining the component 
structure of the overall response. 
In the response mode, the amount and/or kind of recompense is adjusted by 
the subject. Most studies using the response mode have followed Piaget in 
using a choice task (e.g., Brandt & Strattner-Gregory, 1980; Shultz, Wright, & 
Schleifer, 1986). The choice task, unfortunately, is generally ineffectual for 
cognitive analysis (see Wilkening & Anderson, Volume III, Chapter 2). 
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With a quantitative response, Hommers (1986a, 1988d) found multi-modal 
distributions of restitution as a function of victim's fault and harmdoer's fault. 
This points to individual differences in the unusual form of discrete ideals about 
restitution that deserves elucidation. These distributions differed for American 
and German subjects (Hommers, 1988d), moreover, which suggests that such 
distinct ideals are socio-cultural products. These results disagree with modem 
equity theory of justice (Walster, Walster, & Berscheid, 1978), but are con-
sistent with the implicit dependency structure specified in the principle of multi-
ple restitution in the ancient laws, such as the Book of the Covenant (Exodus, 
21-22) and the Hammurabic Code (see Hommers, 1983b, 1988d for more detail 
on the history of recompense). 
The response mode has the advantage that it may eliminate the moral com-
ponent associated with voluntary recompense, thereby simplifying the analysis. 
Also, it facilitates comparison of different kinds of recompense in terms of their 
fittingness to the action. A major problem with recompense in the response 
mode is that it would typically be confounded with retributional punishment. In 
the present experiments, for example, subjects assigned nonzero punishment 
even with full recompense, which indicates that their response included a retri-
butional component. An attractive way to attack this problem is with the duplex 
response technique. 
Duplex Response Technique. Help in unraveling the structure of recompense 
may come from the duplex response technique, in which the subject responds on 
two dimensions simultaneously. With the present stamp scenario, for example, 
the subject could be asked: (a) how many stamps the offender should pay back; 
and (b) how much of some other punishment should be given. The first judg-
ment uses recompense in the response mode to undo the material damage. The 
second judgment allows for additional retributional punishment. 
This example reflects the harmdoer-victim duality already noted. One reac-
tion to a harmful act is to undo or ameliorate the harm. The other is to admonish 
or punish the offender. Duplex response technique provides some separation of 
these two reactions along the two response scales. The recompense itself has 
two components, of course, for the loss of the stamps would be punishment for 
the offender. Something like the insurance manipulation of Experiment 4 might 
be able to separate these two components and assess such variables as intention 
and remorse along the punishment scale itself. 
Duplex response technique extends to situations in which exact recompense 
is not feasible. A cherished possession, for example, may be irreplaceable, but 
its loss may be ameliorated with sympathy or money. Personal injury and men-
tal suffering can also be partly compensated with sympathy, money, or with 
revenge. This is recognized in the law, which may award monetary recompense 
for mental suffering. Such awards rely on assessments of suffering and on 
money/suffering tradeoffs that deserve study. 
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How far mental suffering is recognized in everyday judgments is uncertain. 
In the present stamp scenario, for example, the victim may be presumed to 
suffer, but whether this was a factor in the judgments is unknown. One question 
concerns the effect of giving explicit information about mental suffering. 
Another is whether imputations are made when such information is not expli-
citly given, a topic discussed in a subsection of Experiment 2 (see also Singh, 
this volume, Chapter 4). Both questions have developmental interest. 
A related use of duplex response technique is discussed by Anderson and 
Verdi (1984) for analysis of moral conflict. In moral conflict, the various alter-
native actions all generally have some right on their side; otherwise there would 
be no conflict. Duplex response can portray such conflict exactly, whereas a 
single net response, although often necessary in social action, would miss the 
essence of the conflict. The technique can be extended to allow a separate 
duplex scale to represent the rights and wrongs of each alternative action. 
Duplex response thus has interesting potential for the study of moral judgment. 
The importance of duplex response technique was demonstrated by Hom-
mers and Endres (1988), who obtained duplex judgments of restitution and pun-
ishment for given combinations of harmdoer's fault (inadvertent or intentional) 
and victim's fault (contributory negligence or not). The most interesting result 
was that victim's fault had essentially no effect on the punishment judgment but 
strong effects on the restitution judgment. Victim's fault thus had quite different 
importance for the two components of the duplex response, which are con-
founded in the standard one-dimensional response. In addition, overrestitution 
for intentional harm was drastically reduced relative to corresponding data with 
standard univariate response. Further empirical applications of duplex response 
technique should thus help in analysis of moral judgment. 
Recompense and Prevention. Recompense is one means of social control, but 
it operates differently in different social contexts. A general treatment of 
recompense thus requires consideration of social context and of social sanctions. 
This complex field is beyond the scope of this chapter, but a few comments may 
help point towards a more general conceptual framework. 
The two main social functions of sanctions relate to prevention of future 
harm and recompense for past harm. For prevention of future harm, the main 
concern is effectiveness: to choose sanctions that will indeed prevent. Recom-
pense for past harm, on the other hand, is mainly concerned with justice. Justice 
includes reparation to the victim and retribution to the offender. Retribution 
may well serve a deterrent function, of course, and may even provide affective 
catharsis for the retributors. But retribution, like reparation, also has a primary 
function of recompense by suffering. Retributional punishment may thus, from 
the offender's standpoint, be considered expiation or atonement, a form of moral 
recompense. 
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This moral function of retribution may be demonstrated by considering a 
person who is gUilty of some past offense whose recurrence is not in question, 
as in war-time atrocities. Most people would feel unsatisfied that such a person 
should go free or that his punishment should be rationalized as no more than a 
warning to other potential offenders. Instead, most people would feel that the 
offense represents a fracture of justice, a moral debt that has to be balanced by 
expiational suffering. Such moral accounting thus serves the two-fold purpose 
of conferring justice on the social system and of providing a possibility for 
moral rehabilitation of the offender who has' 'paid his debt to society." 
LAW AND MORAL ALGEBRA 
Few social institutions are so much bound up with information integration as 
legal judgment and decision. Legal judgments of all kinds, including juror judg-
ments, judges' bail setting and sentencing, disciplinary actions of wardens, deci-
sions of parole boards, even daily activities of police officers, all depend on pro-
cessing of evidence. The judge, using that term in a generic sense, sees various 
pieces of evidence that have to be evaluated and integrated to form an overall 
judgment The two basic operations of the theory of information integration, 
namely, valuation and integration, are thus also basic to judgment and decision 
in the legal systems of society. 
Because of this commonality, legal thought may have heuristic value for 
cognitive science (Hommers, 1988c; Hommers & Anderson, 1989). The legal 
thought of today embodies the thinking of generations of legal scholars, and 
constitutes a highly developed albeit complex system of knowledge that has an 
active role in the operation of society. Lawyers and judges must become 
experts in the understanding and use of this system of knowledge. Their own 
cognitive processes are highly structured and so of direct interest to psychologi-
cal science as implicit theories of morality and justice. 
Integration. Two algebraic schemas that deal with recompense have been put 
forward by legal scholars. Von Linstow (1974) proposed a formula with 15 
variables for calculating punishment of traffic violators that may be summarized 
in the form, 
Deserved Punishment = (Culpa + Damage) x Recompense, 
with 0.8 < Recompense < 1.0. Recompense thus yields a proportional reduction 
of deserved punishment, with no recompense having a formula value of 1 and 
hence no reduction. This may be called Schema M, since recompense acts by 
multiplication. 
In Schema S, recompense acts by subtraction: 
Deserved Punishment = Culpa + Damage - Recompense. 
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This schema is in line with paragraph 46 of the 1975 Penal Code of the Federal 
Republic of Germany. According to Maurach, Gossel, and Zipf (1978), two 
components of sentencing are distinguished: harmdoer and act, which 
correspond to culpa and damage. Recompense is considered to affect both com-
ponents: It diminishes the damage caused by the act and it raises the moral 
character of the harm doer, thereby diminishing culpa. The concept of mitigat-
ing circumstances of the British Court of Appeal Criminal Division (Thomas, 
1970) seems to embody a similar idea. 
The existence of different proposed legal schemas raises two questions. 
First is the prescriptive question: Which schema ought the judge to follow? 
As a prescriptive rule, Von Linstow's formula has been criticized by legal scho-
lars (e.g., Bruns, 1974, 1980; Zipf, 1977), but this question lies outside the 
present discussion. Second is the descriptive or cognitive question: Which, if 
either, schema do judges actually follow? This question has practical relevance 
both to judges, whose practice rests on their schemas, and to laypersons, who 
suffer their sentences. 
Progress on the cognitive question is possible with the concepts and methods 
illustrated in the foregoing experiments. These results point to a nonadditive 
version of Schema S with laypersons. What is needed is replication with 
experts, using scenarios more relevant to criminal law. This would be theoreti-
cally straightforward within the present approach. Such studies would have 
great social interest because of their potential for revealing the cognitive 
processes of the experts. 
Valuation. Valuation is prerequisite to operation of an integration schema for 
legal judgment. The value of culpa in Schemas M and S, for example, must be 
determined before the schema can be applied. Valuation is a matter of expert 
judgment and is sensitive to the particulars of the context and situation. Much 
of legal training is aimed at developing expert knowledge systems for valuation, 
as illustrated in the discussion of responsibility by Hart and Honore (1959). 
Value analysis seems to adhere to a prescriptive ideal in legal thinking, in 
which judgment should be independent of the judge. This prescriptive ideal 
appears in determinate sentencing systems (Von Hirsch, Knapp, & Tonry, 
1987), for example, which seek to reduce values to an objective standard to 
make judges' sentences more uniform. But this prescriptive ideal is only partly 
realizable, as is indicated by divided court decisions and in the problem of 
disparity of sentences across judges, which presumably arise because judges 
differ in their personal values and weights for the same evidence. Indeed, some 
allowance for personal values may be built into the legal system, as with sen-
tencing ranges within which the judge has explicit discretion. In the last 
analysis, moreover, the ideal prescriptive values arise from and embody psycho-
logical values. 
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Accordingly, no theory of legal judgment can be complete without capability 
for measuring personal values. Cognitive algebra provides a unique approach 
that can solve this valuation problem at the same time that it determines the 
operative integration schema. Integration schemas may thus be transformed 
from qualitative verbalisms with un quantified symbols into quantitative laws of 
cognition with quantified moral values. This capability opens up a new horizon 
for both cognitive and prescriptive aspects of legal thinking. 
Nonadditive Moral Algebra in Legal Thought. The present approach leads 
to the hypothesis that law embodies a moral algebra, as has been illustrated with 
the foregoing treatment of recompense schemas. In the law, moreover, recom-
pense has different functions that relate to the two-fold structure of civil and 
criminal sanctions. 
The civil law is intended to rectify injustice by restoring injured rights. The 
first concern is to provide justice for the victim. The operation of moral algebra 
may be seen in the complicated rules developed by jurists for calculating distri-
bution of damage over several involved parties. Such recompense, however, 
may also contain a punitive element, as with awards for multiple damages in 
modem law or in the prescription of the Judaic code that four sheep shall be 
repaid for one stolen sheep (Exodus, 22: 1). 
The criminal law, on the other hand, focuses on the harmdoer rather than the 
injured party. In this case, the two main functions ofrecompense are retribution 
and reparation, both of which relate to the blame schema in the manner already 
indicated. This appears in the rules and normative theories that jurists have 
developed about considering recompense when sentencing, as in the notions of 
Strajzumessungserwiigungen and StraJzumessungstatsachen in German law 
(Bruns, 1974). 
More detailed analysis of the moral algebra of law must address the problem 
of nonadditivity. Although additivity held for culpa-damage integration, nonad-
ditivity was prominent in the foregoing experiments on recompense, and it 
appears to be a major characteristic of the more general concepts of mitigation 
and aggravation. For illustration, it is worth detailing the formula for the Min-
nesota determinate sentencing act (Tonry, 1981). The two main determinants 
are seriousness of offense and prior record, both intended to be assessed in 
objective terms. The values of these two determinants constitute the rows and 
columns of a factorial-type matrix, and the cells of the matrix specify the stan-
dard sentence for given values of row and column. The sentence for Aggra-
vated Robbery, for example, varies from 24 to 97 months as a function of prior 
record. Inspection of the matrix shows it is nonadditive in the specified metric 
of sentence duration. An additional source of nonadditivity may arise from the 
discretion allowed the judge to take account of mitigating/aggravating cir-
cumstances, which is plus-or-minus a number of months specified separately for 
each cell of the matrix, the range of discretion being greater for more severe 
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sentences. Similar considerations apply to the sentencing matrixes for Washing-
ton, DC and Pennsylvania (Von Hirsch, Knapp, & Tonry, 1987, Appendix, 
pp. 183, 186-187). This mitigation-aggravation factor may be viewed as a third 
dimension of the sentencing matrix but its algebraic role is partly dependent on 
the personal discretion of each judge. This question needs empirical study with 
judges' actual sentences. 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF LEGAL SCHEMAS 
Cognitive theory of judgment and decision in legal settings requires experimen-
tal analysis. Previous work on legal decision has generally relied on 
phenomenological observation or on statistical methods based on aggregates of 
cases. Phenomenological observation can be invaluable, but is notoriously falli-
ble. Standard statistical methods can be useful for practical prediction, but have 
little value for cognitive analysis. This section discusses an experimental 
approach, personal design, that can solve certain problems of experimental 
analysis in the natural settings of legal practice. 
Observational Analysis. A natural approach to the study of moral algebra in 
the law is through analysis of actual cases. This may be done phenomenologi-
cally, with a focus on single cases, following the case tradition of Anglo-Saxon 
law. Indeed, judges' opinions constitute a phenomenological data base, for they 
reflect judges' valuation and integration processes. 
This is the natural place to begin the study of judicial judgment-decision. 
For psychological analysis, it would be important to supplement judges' written 
opinions with in-depth interviews to reduce ambiguity and incompleteness in the 
written record. Such phenomenological reports can provide priceless informa-
tion about cognitive processes,' especially about background knowledge 
developed through extended legal experience. 
Judges' opinions are self-report data, and so must be expected to suffer the 
same limitations and pitfalls found with self-report data throughout psychology. 
An example appears in Bauer's (1984) study of sentencing by German judges in 
traffic cases. Although length of sentence had a high correlation with the facts 
of the case, the written justifications were largely stereotypic commonplaces that 
had little relation to length of sentence. In the present approach, however, these 
phenomenological data are not ends in themselves, but rather a beginning for 
experimental analysis. The problem is to find some way to embed experimental 
analysis of cognitive process within realistic settings. 
Multiple Regression-Correlation Analysis. In legal psychology, the statisti-
cal approach of linear regression-correlation models is widely used, as illus-
trated in the field studies of bail setting and sentencing reported by Koneeni and 
Ebbesen (1982). This statistical approach depends on aggregating many cases, 
each coded in terms of pertinent variables. Criminal sentences, for example, 
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may be coded in terms of severity of sentence, together with such predictor vari-
ables as kind and severity of offense, extenuating circumstances, prior offenses, 
and so forth. Thus coded, the data may be subjected to ordinary multiple regres-
sion analysis or to log-linear analysis (e.g., Haberman, 1978), which performs 
similar functions for qualitative, categorical data. 
Such statistical analysis has many uses. Foremost is that it provides a socio-
logical overview of the operation of legal systems that is essential for evaluating 
how and how well they function. Some of these uses can be seen in the early 
descriptive approaches to the development of sentencing and parole guidelines 
(Wilkins, Kress, Gottfredson, Calpin, & Gelman, 1976), in sociological analyses 
of criminal sentencing (Myers & Talarico, 1987), and in evaluation research of 
sentencing reform (Knapp, 1987), which have relied on linear regression ana-
lyses of legal sentencing practice. As Konecni and Ebbesen (1982) and Tonry 
(1981) have noted, society has little solid knowledge about the functioning of 
various legal systems, and these investigations raise serious concerns that justice 
may be systematically unjust. 
Unexpected benefits may also be obtained. Thus, an incidental finding in the 
statistical study of bail setting by Ebbesen and Konecni (1975) was that one or 
another important information variable was absent in about 35% of the cases. 
Similarly, Wilkins et al. (1976) reported that nearly 25% of the 205 coded items 
were unavailable in over 25% of the cases. As pointed out by Anderson (1976, 
pp. 111-121; 1982, pp. 303-304), this reflects the exigencies of the courtroom 
situation, and much might be done for justice by the simple device of instituting 
a standard information schedule for each case. 
Nevertheless, the statistical approach has well-known limitations, especially 
as concerns causal interpretation from correlational data bases. In their study of 
sentencing, for example, Konecni and Ebbesen (1982) were unable to distin-
guish two simple and quite different causal models. As another example, it is 
often claimed that some ethnic or occupational groups are treated more severely 
than others. If other things were equal, this would indicate the operation of 
stereotypes and prejudice. But other things are likely to be far from equal. Eth-
nic groups may differ systematically with respect to prior record, for example, 
or even age, which can, at best, be only crudely corrected in the statistical model 
(see also Anderson, 1982, Sections 4.1 and 7.9). Occupational groups, on the 
other hand, may receive different objective treatment because the judge takes 
account of retributional damage to their social standing, in accord with the fore-
going blame schema. 
For psychological theory, therefore, the statistical approach has limited 
relevance. The valuation and integration operations in the statistical model are 
unlikely to bear any clear relation to the valuation and integration processes of 
individual judges. As regards valuation, the statistical approach depends on 
more or less arbitrary selection and coding of variables, which must then be 
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applied uniformly across a heterogeneous mass of cases. The judge, in contrast, 
evaluates the evidence by reference to a mass of expert knowledge, legal, socio-
logical, cultural, and moral, ill-represented in the statistical model. 
As regards integration, the statistical models have repeatedly been shown to 
misrepresent cognitive process. This has been found in clinical psychology, 
personnel selection, and Bayesian decision theory, where statistical methods can 
outperform expert judges but are insensitive and misleading about cognitive pro-
cess (see Anderson, 1981a, pp. 22-23,91; 1986; Wright, 1984, Chapter 6). The 
same may be true for legal judgment (Ebbesen & Konecni, 1975; see Anderson, 
1982, pp. 304, 306). For analysis of cognitive process, it is almost essential to 
manipulate relevant variables experimentally. 
Experimental Analysis. Experimental analysis is an essential companion to 
observational analysis. Without experimental control of some aspects of the 
stimulus situation, it is exceptionally difficult and treacherous to resolve the 
causal ambiguities inherent in observational data. Experimental analysis of 
legal judgment-decision rests on three desiderata: 
• causal analysis of multiple determinants, 
• allowance for subjective values, and 
• analysis of individual judges. 
The role of these desiderata is clear. Judgment-decision in law typically 
involves multiple considerations. Without theory and methods that can analyze 
the role of each determinant in a given case, the basic process of multiple deter-
mination cannot be understood. This methodology must allow for subjective 
values of each determinant, moreover, for it is the meaning of the stimulus 
information that is the operative cognition. Since these meanings may differ for 
different judges, the methodology must be able to operate within the knowledge 
system of each individual judge. 
All three desiderata are fulfilled with the functional measurement methodol-
ogy of the theory of information integration. Indeed, these desiderata 
correspond exactly to the integration and valuation operations of the theory. 
Functional measurement has several advantages over the statistical methods 
noted in the previous subsection, at least as these have usually been applied. 
Functional measurement can allow for personal values, which are essential for 
cognitive analysis, whereas the statistical methods depend on more or less arbi-
trary, nonpersonal values. Personal values make possible rigorous tests of the 
cognitive integration rules, which is not generally possible with the statistical 
methods. Moreover, functional measurement recognizes that circumstances 
alter cases, that the same piece of information may have different meanings in 
different cases. This situational, constructionist view seems essential to cogni-
tive analysis of legal judgment. 
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The central problem for experimental analysis is to relate to the functioning 
of a chosen legal system. Although experimental manipulation within such a 
setting is not generally possible, experimental analysis can still be employed to 
good effect, as indicated in the next subsection. 
Embedding Method and Personal Design. Application of functional meas-
urement to legal cognition may be facilitated with the embedding method and 
personal design. The embedding method, as the name suggests, involves 
embedding an integration task within a relevant social context. The purpose of 
the embedding is to allow experimental manipulation of some stimulus informa-
tion within the chosen social context. Personal design carries this to the limit by 
constructing the integration task within the knowledge system of a selected indi-
vidual (Anderson, in press). 
Embedding within a legal setting could begin with a base case from some 
actual jurisdiction, selected to allow realistic manipulation of relevant variables. 
Variant cases would then be constructed, each differing in realistic specifics 
from the base case. Such variables could include severity of the offense, miti-
gating circumstances, motivation and personal character of the harm doer, and so 
forth. By using factorial-type design, as in the present experiment, the pattern-
ing in the data can allow straightforward diagnosis of certain integration rules. 
Although group data were analyzed in the present experiments, the same pro-
cedures can be applied to indi vidual data. 
Personal design carries the embedding method further by using the indivi-
dual for selection both of the base case and of the information variables. Task 
and design may both be personalized. Phenomenological and prior observa-
tional analyses could thus be incorporated within a rigorous experimental design 
and extended through experimental analysis. Functional measurement can allow 
for knowledge that does not ascend to the level of consciousness and 
phenomenological report. Many cognitive factors will never reach the 
phenomenological level. These include unconscious or unverbalizable motiva-
tions, as well as cultural and judicial assumptions so taken for granted that the 
judge is unaware of making them. 
Some loss of realism is inevitable even with the embedding method. A per-
sonal design would ordinarily be presented in the quiet of a judge's chambers, 
not in the hubbub of the courtroom. Missing, therefore, would be multifarious 
aspects of courtroom procedure, including information cues not in the personal 
design, together with lapses of attention and flashes of humor and irritation that 
distinguish an actual court. But what is being studied is the cognitive system of 
the judge, which is assumed to be much the same in chambers as on the bench. 
The integration rules may thus be expected to have reasonable generality, even 
though the specific information being integrated may differ markedly across 
cases. The valuation processes, similarly, may be expected to be reasonably 
general, even though the specific information being evaluated is variable across 
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cases. Although loss of courtroom realism could be serious for sociological stu-
dies of actual outcomes, many process questions can be studied outside the 
actual courtroom. 
Two such process questions are the basal-surface representation of attitudes 
and the concept of functional memory (see Chapter 1 of Volume I). The basal-
surface representation, which was found in an experiment using stimulus materi-
als taken from a classic case of evidence in an actual bigamy trial (see Appendix 
A), implies that attitudes have two components: a labile surface component, 
which is easily swayed by new evidence; and an underlying basal component, 
which, once formed, is very resistant to change. Functional memory theory 
shows that judgments are not generally based on what can be recalled, as is 
required by the traditional conception of reproductive memory, but on cumula-
tive integration of processed meanings of the stimulus materials. The basal-
surface representation and functional memory are both important for legal 
psychology but neither could have been established without experimental 
analysis. 
The case method of instruction in law has an important similarity to the 
embedding method. Study of past cases in lawbooks may actually have less 
realism than cases in a personal design, yet it is a preferred mode of instruction. 
The case method could, moreover, be coupled with the embedding method. 
Law students would thus consider, not just the single case, but a number of vari-
ant cases designed to have legal interest and to satisfy conditions for functional 
measurement. In this way, it may be possible to embed the study of legal cogni-
tion within legal curricula. 
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APPENDIX 
The Bigamy Trial of Thomas Hoag 
This appendix gives the stimulus materials used in the experiment that led to the 
basal-surface representation of attitudes (Anderson, 1959; see Figure 3 of Volume I, 
Chapter 1). These materials were taken from Wigmore's (1937) book on evidence, 
and had previously been used in a psychological experiment by Weld and Roff 
(1938). These stimuli include the indictment, the summarized testimony of 14 
witnesses, and a denouement in the form of two pieces of court testimony that 
brought the trial to a close. The testimony of some witnesses was reworded to bring 
all to approximately equal length of 175 words. 
The order of evidence is as follows: The indictment; the six prosecution 
witnesses used in the main design; the six defense witnesses used in the main design; 
two more prosecution witnesses; and finally the two pieces of court procedure. These 
are preceded by the first page of the subjects' booklet, which was used as part of the 
instructions and for adaptation to the task. The relative strengths of the 12 main 
pieces of evidence are tabulated at the end. 
EXAMPLE OF TESTIMONY (NOT RELATED TO TRIAL IN ANY WAY) 
John Doe testified, that he lived in Chicago; that he had lived in Chicago since the 
year 1946; that he knew the prisoner at the bar, Richard Roe, well; that witness and 
prisoner had worked together for many years; that in June of 1948, witness and pris-
oner being at work together, prisoner became faint and desired witness to bring him a 
glass of water which he had done; that witness thereafter assisted prisoner to his 
house; that prisoner remained ill for four or five weeks after which time he again 
resumed work; that witness was sure of the month and year because it was the same 
year that he and prisoner were to assist in a fireworks exhibition; that during all the 
years witness had known prisoner, he bore an unexceptionable character. 
INDICTMENT 
The prisoner was indicted for that whereas Thomas Hoag, late of Haverstraw, in the 
county of Rockland, laborer, otherwise called Joseph Parker, now of the city of New 
York, cartman, on the 8th of May, 1797, at the said city of New York, was lawfully 
married to Susan Faesch, and the said Susan then and there had for a wife, and the 
said Thomas, alias, etc., afterwards, to wit, on the 25th day of December, 1800, at the 
county of Rockland, his said wife being then in full life, feloniously did marry, and to 
wife did take, one Catherine Secor, etc. To this the prisoner pleaded Not Guilty. 
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Benjamin Coe, witness for the Prosecution 
Benjamin Coe testified, that he was one of the judges of the court of common pleas in 
the county of Rockland; that he well knew the prisoner at the bar; that he came to 
Rockland in the beginning of September, in the year 1800, and there passed by the 
name of Thomas Hoag; that there was a person with him who passed for his brother; 
but between these two persons there was no sort of resemblance; that the prisoner 
worked for witness about a month, during which time he ate daily at witness's table, 
and he, of course, saw him daily; that on the 25th day of December, 1800, witness 
married the prisoner to one Catherine Secor; that witness is confident of the time, 
because he recollected that on that very day one of his own children was christened; 
that during all the time the prisoner remained in Rockland county, witness saw him 
continually; he was therefore as much satisfied that the prisoner was Thomas Hoag as 
that he himself was Benjamin Coe. 
Nicholas Conklin, witness for the Prosecution 
Nicholas W. Conklin testified, that he lived in Rockland county; that he knew the 
prisoner at the bar; that his name was Thomas Hoag; that he could not be mistaken; 
that Hoag had worked a considerable time for him; that during that time he had eaten 
at witness's table; that Hoag, being a stranger, and witness understanding that he was 
paying addresses to Catherine Secor, witness took a good deal of notice of him; 
thought him a clever fellow; lived in a house belonging to witness. When witness 
saw prisoner at this place, he knew him instantly; his gait, his smile, which is a very 
peculiar one, his very look was that of Thomas Hoag. Hoag, he thought, was about 
twenty-eight or thirty years of age; he thought Hoag had a small scar on his neck. 
Witness endeavored, but in vain, to find some difference in appearance between the 
prisoner and Hoag; he was satisfied in his own mind that he is the same person. 
Abraham Wendell, witness for the Prosecution 
Abraham Wendell testified, that he knew one Thomas Hoag in the latter end of the 
year 1800; he was then in Haverstraw; that he had been very intimate with him, and 
knew him as well as he knew any man; that he had worked with him, had break-
fasted, dined, and supped with him, and many a time had been at frolics with him, 
and that the prisoner at the bar was the same man; that he had no doubt whatever 
about it; that about a year ago, witness being in New York was told by some persons 
that Hoag had been concerned in an action wherein his identity had come in question; 
that witness told them he could know him with certainty; that they said they would 
send him down to him that day; that witness was aboard his sloop, saw prisoner at a 
distance of a hundred yards, coming down the street, and instantly knew him; pris-
oner came up to him and said immediately, "Mr. Wendell, I am told you will say you 
know me," to which witness replied, "So I do; you are Thomas Hoag;" that witness 
was as confident prisoner is the person, as he was of his own existence. 
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Lavinia Anderson, witness for the Prosecution 
Lavinia Anderson testified, that she knew the prisoner at the bar; his name was Tho-
mas Hoag; that in September, 1800, he came to witness's house in Rockland county, 
and worked for her husband eight or ten days, then worked for Judge Suffrein; every 
Saturday night until the prisoner was married, he and a person who passed for his 
brother, came to witness's house and stayed till Monday morning; that witness 
washed for him; that there was no mark on his linen; that Hoag had a scar on his fore-
head which was plain to be seen on the prisoner; that Hoag's voice was very singular, 
shrill, thick, hurried, and something of a lisp; that Hoag had also a habit of shrugging 
his shoulders when he spoke, which she had also observed in the prisoner. Witness 
added that it was impossible that she could be mistaken--prisoner was Thomas Hoag. 
Michael Burke, witness for the Prosecution 
Michael Burke testified, that he lived in Catherine street in the city of New York; that 
he had formerly lived in Haverstraw, in Rockland county; that he saw prisoner at the 
bar several times at Haverstraw, before and after his marriage in December, 1800; 
that he was well satisfied as he could be of anything, that prisoner was the same per-
son he knew in Haverstraw; that about two years ago he met the prisoner in the 
Bowery in New York, at the time of the Harlem races; prisoner spoke to witness and 
said, "Am 1 not a relation of yours?" Witness replied, "I don't know." Prisoner said, 
"I am; 1 married Katy Secor." 
Upon cross-examination, witness admitted that he and prisoner had had a quarrel 
respecting witness calling prisoner Thomas Hoag. 
Catherine Conklin, witness for the Prosecution 
Catherine Conklin (formerly Catherine Secor) testified, that she became acquainted 
with prisoner in the beginning of September, 1800, when he came to Rockland; he 
then passed by the name of Thomas Hoag; that witness saw him constantly; that pris-
oner, shortly after their acquaintance, paid his addresses to her and finally, on the 
25th of December, married her; that he lived with her till the latter end of March, 
1801, when he left her; that she did not see him again until two years after; that on 
the morning of his leaving her, he appeared desirous of communicating something to 
her of importance, but was dissuaded from it by a person who was with him and who 
passed for his brother; that Hoag, until his departure, was a kind, attentive and affec-
tionate husband; that she was as well convinced as she could possibly be of anything 
in this world, that the prisoner at the bar was the person who married her by the name 
of Thomas Hoag; that she then thought him and still thinks him the handsomest man 
she ever saw. 
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Elizabeth Mitchell, witness for the Defense 
Elizabeth Mitchell testified, that she knew Parker, the prisoner at the bar, well; that in 
1800 and 1801 Parker lived in Capt. Pelors house adjoining witness's house; that wit-
ness was in habits of intimacy with Parker's family, and visited them constantly; that 
Parker being one of the city watch, she used to hear him rap with his stick at the door, 
to awaken his family, upon his return from the watch in the morning; that she also 
remembered, perfectly well, Parker's borrowing a screw for packing cotton from her 
on Christmas day, in 1800; she offered him some spirits to drink, but he preferred 
wine, which she got for him; the circumstances of her lending the screw to him she 
was the more positive of, from recollecting, also, that it was broken by Parker in 
using it; that from that time to the present day, witness had been on the same terms of 
intimacy with Parker's family; she therefore considered it as almost impossible that 
Parker could have been absent from town, any time, without her knowing it; and she 
never knew him to be absent more than one week, while he lived at Pelor's house. 
Magnus Beekman, witness for the Defense 
Magnus Beekman testified, that he had lived in New York a number of years; that he 
was captain of the city watch of the second district; that he was well acquainted with 
the prisoner at the bar, Joseph Parker; that he, Parker, had been for many years a 
watchman, and had done duty constantly on the watch; that he at first served as a sub-
stitute on the watch, but that later he served as a regular member of the watch; that 
witness recurring to his books, where he keeps a register of the watchmen and of their 
times of service, found that the prisoner, Joseph Parker, was regularly upon duty as a 
watchman during the months of October, November, and December, 1800, and Janu-
ary and February, 1801, and particularly that he was upon duty the 26th of December, 
1800. 
Joseph Chadwick, witness for the Defense 
Joseph Chadwick testified, that he had been acquainted with the prisoner, Joseph 
Parker, a number of years; that witness resides in New York, is a rigger by trade; that 
the prisoner worked in the employ of the witness a considerable time as a rigger; that 
prisoner began to work for witness in September, 1799, and continued to work for 
him till the spring of 1801; that during that period he saw him constantly; that it 
appeared from witness's books that Parker received money from witness, for work 
which he had performed on the following days, viz.: on the 6th of October, and 6th 
and 13th December, 1800; on the 9th, 16th and 28th February, and 11th March, 1801; 
that Parker lived from May, 1800, till sometime in April, 1801, in a house in the city 
of New York belonging to Capt. Pelor; that during that period, and since, witness has 
been well acquainted with the prisoner. 
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Lewis Osborne, witness for the Defense 
Lewis Osborne testified, that he had been acquainted with Parker, the prisoner at the 
bar, for the last four years; that witness had been one of the city watch; that from 
June, 1800, to May, 1801, Parker served upon the watch with witness; that, at first, 
Parker served as a substitute; that witness remembered that Parker, a few days after 
Christmas, in 1800, was placed upon the roll of the regular watch, in place of one 
Ransom, who was taken sick; witness was certain it was in the period above men-
tioned, because that was the only time witness ever served upon the watch; that dur-
ing the above period, witness and Parker were stationed together, while on the watch, 
at the same post; witness was certain that Parker, the prisoner at the bar, was the per-
son with whom he had served upon the watch, and was confident that during that time 
Parker was never absent from the watch, more than a week, at anyone time. 
James Juquar, witness for the Defense 
James Juquar testified, that he had known Joseph Parker, the prisoner at the bar, for 
seven years past; that he had been intimate with him at that time; that they had both 
worked together as riggers until Parker became a cartman; knew Parker when he 
lived in Capt. Pelor's house; never knew him absent from the city during this time, 
for a day, except when he was working on board one of the United States frigates, 
about a week, at Staten Island. In the year 1799, prisoner hurt himself on board the 
Adams frigate, and then went to his father's in Westchester county, and was absent 
near a month; he was very ill when he left town; witness went with him, and brought 
him back again, before he was quite recovered; recollects Parker and some other 
company passing Christmas eve at witness's house the year that Parker lived in Capt. 
Pelor's house, which was in 1800. 
Isaac Ryckman, witness for the Defense 
Isaac Ryckman testified, that he was well acquainted with Joseph Parker, the prisoner 
at the bar; that witness and Parker were jointly engaged in the latter part of the year 
1800, in loading a vessel for Capt. Tredwell, of New York; that they began to work 
on the 20th day of December, 1800, and were employed the greater part of the month 
of January, 1801, in the loading of the vessel; that during that time the witness and 
Parker worked together daily; the witness recollected well that they worked together 
on the 25th day of December, 1800; he remembered it because he never worked on 
Christmas day, before or since; and he remembered it because they borrowed a screw 
for the purpose of packing cotton into the hold of the vessel they were at work at, 
from a Mrs. Mitchell, who lived next door to Parker; that Parker was also at that time 
upon the watch; and that witness had served with him from that time to the present 
day upon the watch, and never recollected missing him any time during that period 
from the city. 
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Moses Anderson, witness for the Prosecution 
Moses Anderson testified, that he had lived in Haverstraw, Rockland county since the 
year 1791; that he knew the prisoner at the bar well; that he came to the house of the 
witness in the beginning of September, 1800; that he then passed by the name of Tho-
mas Hoag; that he worked for the witness eight or ten days; that from that time till the 
25th of December, prisoner passed almost every Sunday at witness's house; that if 
prisoner was the person alluded to, he had a scar on his forehead, which he told wit-
ness was occasioned by the kick of a horse; he had also a small scar on his neck 
(those marks the prisoner had); he had also a scar under his foot, between the heel 
and ball of the foot, occasioned, as he told witness, by treading on a drawing knife; 
that that scar was easy to be seen; that his speech was remarkable, his voice being 
effeminate; that he spoke quick and lisped a little (these peculiarities were observable 
in prisoner's speech); that witness was perfectly satisfied in his own mind that pris-
oner was Thomas Hoag. 
John Knapp, witness for the Prosecution 
John Knapp testified, that he knew the prisoner in 1800 and 1801, he was then in 
Rockland county, and passed by the name of Thomas Hoag; that he saw him con-
stantly for five months, during the time the prisoner was at Rockland; that he was at 
the prisoner's wedding; that Hoag had a scar under his foot; the way that witness 
knew it, was that he and Hoag were leaping together, and witness outleaped Hoag, 
upon which the latter remarked that he could not leap as well now as formerly, in 
consequence of a wound in his foot occasioned by treading on a drawing knife; that 
Hoag then pulled off his shoe and showed witness the scar under his foot, occasioned 
by that wound; the scar was very perceptible; witness was confident prisoner at the 
bar was Thomas Hoag. 
Here it was agreed between the attorney-general and the counsel for prisoner, that the 
prisoner should exhibit his foot to the jury, in order that they might see whether there 
was that scar which had been spoken of in such positive terms by several of the 
witnesses on the part of the people. Upon exhibiting his foot, not the least mark or 
scar could be seen on either of them. 
The jury, without retiring from the bar, found a verdict of not guilty. 
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The relative strengths of the testimony are given in the following tabulation. These 
are the means of the changes produced by each witness' testimony over stages 1-3 of 
the main experiment (Anderson, 1959, Figures 1-3). The design balanced particular 
witnesses over stages and over trials within stage. Entries are averages taken over 
192 subjects. 
Defense Witness Strength 
Elizabeth Mitchell 1.20 
Magnus Beekman 1.20 
Joseph Chadwick .56 
Lewis Osborne .49 
James Juquar .84 
Isaac Ryckrr.an 1.51 
Prosecution Witness Strength 
Benjamin Coe 1.55 
Nicholas Conklin .46 
Abraham Wendell .70 
Lavinia Anderson .84 
Michael Burke .28 
Catherine Conklin 1.24 
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